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THE "BACKLASH" OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY: THEORY VS. ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the implied warranty of habitability' (implied war-
ranty) marked a dramatic departure from the common law land-
lord-tenant relationship and sparked an academic melee over the
warranty's expected effect.2 This melee reflected broader debates
over housing laws; in particular, housing laws with paternalistic under-
pinnings had become, and still remain, a breeding ground for aca-
demic debate.3 Law and policy debates over government housing
regulations4 commonly reflect a number of interrelated but divisible
concerns: whether the law will "backlash" and cause harm to the in-
tended beneficiary;5 whether the law can achieve the intended result;6
1. The implied warranty, in the most basic sense, is a landlord's implied promise to a tenant
that the rented premises are and will remain habitable for the duration of the lease period. See,
e.g., Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Conse-
quences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 522 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 1, at 521-22, 558-59 (discussing the back-and-forth academic
debate over the implied warranty).
3. Judge Posner's concurrence in Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d
732, 741-42 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring), provides an example of the criticism of
comprehensive landlord-tenant regulations within the context of the debate against government
regulation. See also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "Don't Try This at Home": Posner as Political Econ-
omist, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1873 (2007) (discussing Judge Posner's concurrence in Chicago Board
of Realtors in the context of the debate). Ezra Rosser has discussed the debate in the context of
various rural housing codes. See Ezra Rosser, Rural Housing and Code Enforcement: Navigating
Between Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 33 (2006). This debate
remains alive today. See generally Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for
Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 (2007) (discussing various American "housing eth-
ics" and the manner in which they shape housing policy and law); Stephanie M. Stern, Residen-
tial Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1093 (2009) (arguing
that regulatory homeownership laws have not been shown to be beneficial to homeowners).
4. As used here, the phrase "government housing regulations" refers broadly to legislative
and judicial creations as well as the enforcement of statutes and rules that affect residential
housing. While the concerns noted here are not limited to residential housing, or housing gener-
ally, they are discussed in that context for the purposes of this Comment.
5. See infra notes 131-55 and accompanying text. Robert Hillman has argued that despite the
frequent criticism of new legislation on the basis of a "legal backlash," such backlashes occur
infrequently. Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REV. 819, 821
(2002).
6. Stephanie Stern has argued that empirical data does not support the belief that homeowner
protection laws play a large role in the intended "psychological" protection of homeowners. See
Stern, supra note 3, at 1110-20. It has also been argued that a flawed understanding of rental
housing markets has led to regulations that will not increase housing affordability. See John I.
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whether the law will create unintended consequences;7 and whether
the application of the law to advance social housing policies is justi-
fied.8 Each of these concerns was debated following adoption of the
implied warranty of habitability; while some were raised indepen-
dently, they were most often examined in the aggregate.9
Beginning in the early 1970s, legal scholars and economists ad-
vanced numerous theoretical formulas to support their vying conten-
tions over what effect the warranty would have on landlords and
tenants alike.10 Judge Richard Posner and other like-minded legal
economists argued that the warranty would benefit high-income te-
nants at the expense of both landlords and low-income tenants." In
contrast, the "dissenters,"1 2 led by Bruce Ackerman, contended that
tenants as a class would benefit from imposition of the warranty.13 A
Gilderbloom & Richard P. Appelbaum, Toward a Sociology of Rent: Are Rental Housing Mar-
kets Competitive?, 34 Soc. PROas. 261, 272 (1987).
7. One example of this concern is the contention that homeowner protection laws have "en-
courage[d] overinvestment in residential real estate, disproportionately burden[ed] lower-in-
come households, raise[d] the cost of credit, and frustrate[d] land planning and controlled
growth." Stern, supra note 3, at 1102.
8. Peter Salins has criticized the policy goal of increasing affordability in housing as a "moving
target" without defined lines that "can never be eliminated." Peter D. Salins, Toward a Perma-
nent Housing Problem, 85 PUB. INT. 22, 23-25 (1986). While some commentators have argued
that redistribution of wealth is better obtained through the tax system rather than through hous-
ing laws, others have argued that redistributive legal rules are equally effective and contain
greater advantages. Compare Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through
Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326 (2006) (arguing that private redistribution laws are justifiable
and in some cases preferable to alternatives such as taxes), with David A. Weisbach, Should
Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2003) (arguing that redis-
tribution of wealth to the poor is best achieved through the tax system).
9. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 1, at 521-22, 558-59.
10. See infra Part II.E.
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAw 259-63 (1972) (arguing that code
enforcement through habitability laws will lead to abandonment of rental property by landlords
and increased rents for poor tenants). See generally Neil K. Komesar, Return to Slumville: A
Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J.
1175 (1973); Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27
STAN. L. REV. 879 (1975); Daniel P. Schwallie, Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability as a
Mechanism for Redistributing Income: Good Goal, Bad Policy, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 525
(1989).
12. Rabin calls these "Dissident Theories." Rabin, supra note 1, at 559.
13. See generally Bruce Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply
to Professor Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194 (1973) [hereinafter Ackerman, More on Slum Hous-
ing]; Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing]; Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules:
Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361 (1990); Duncan
Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: "Milking" and
Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485 (1987); Richard S. Markovits, The Distributive Im-
pact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical
Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1976).
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study led by Werner Hirsch in 1975 provided fuel for the debate by
showing a relationship between higher rent rates and habitability laws;
however, the study was the first and only of its kind. 14 While the over-
all conclusions reached by both proponents and opponents varied
greatly, all were linked by a single concern: would the implied war-
ranty increase the cost of rent?15
Despite the passage of forty years and the abatement of the back-
and-forth nature of the early academic debate, the underlying concern
regarding the implied warranty's effect on rental rates remains unset-
tled.16 Modern authors continue to argue for or against comparable
landlord-tenant legislation in residential and commercial contexts
based upon forty-year-old theories. Property textbooks ask students
to debate the effects of the implied warranty like an exam hypotheti-
cal; however, when the debate ends, students are left to wonder if
their arguments have any support in reality. This Comment is in-
tended to provoke contemplation in academics and students alike by
analyzing residential rental rates in order to settle a pervasive concern
of this forty-year debate.
This Comment analyzes and discusses the effects of the implied
warranty in four parts. First, Part II provides the necessary historical
overview of the common law landlord-tenant relationship and the
changes made to this relationship through judicial and legislative ac-
tion.17 Part II then addresses the major arguments and theoretical ba-
ses behind the debate over the effects of the implied warranty.18 Part
III uses analyses of historical rent data to examine the relationship
between adoption of the implied warranty and rent rates.19 Next, Part
14. Werner Z. Hirsch et al., Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws upon Rent:
An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 CALW. L. REV. 1098 (1975); see
also Werner Z. Hirsch, Habitability Laws and the Welfare of Indigent Tenants, 63 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 263 (1981); but see Hillman, supra note 5, at 842 (stating that Hirsch's study is "dated and
unreliable because it is based largely on opinion and predictions").
15. See infra Part II.E. The variation in conclusions referenced here is an acknowledgment of
the fact that both proponents and critics argued distinct points, emphasized diverging concerns,
and utilized different theoretical approaches in arriving at varying conclusions. Compare Acker-
man, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1111-12, 1179-81, 1193-96 (determining that
rent rates would not increase if landlord abandonment was minimal and tenants decided to
"double up" instead of pay increased rents alone), with Kennedy, supra note 13, at 498-99 (de-
termining that rent rates could be depressed due to a combination of slower deterioration of
low-rent housing and continued filtering of higher-rent housing to lower-rent levels). One pro-
ponent of the warranty went so far as to argue that a rise in rent rates was not a sign of failure;
instead, such a rise was the best evidence that the warranty had effectively benefited housing
consumers. See Craswell, supra note 13, at 398.
16. See Hillman, supra note 5, at 842; Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1876.
17. See infra notes 22-110 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 111-58 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 159-98 and accompanying text.
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IV presents and discusses the results of these analyses. 20 Finally, Part
V examines the implications of empirical evidence that demonstrates
the existence of a relationship between the implied warranty and
higher rent rates. 21
II. BACKGROUND: FROM CAVEAT LESSEE TO CAVEAT LESSOR 2 2
Until the second half of the twentieth century, landlord-tenant law
in the United States was almost entirely derived from the English
common law. 2 3 This perspective, developed to fit the needs of a
largely agrarian society, examined leases and the landlord-tenant re-
lationship in a manner distinct from that of the modern law in both
England and the United States.24 It was not until the 1960s and 1970s,
when the United States became home to a "revolution in residential
landlord-tenant law,"25 that courts and legislators reevaluated the
500-year-old landlord-tenant laws that remained the "black letter
law" in the United States.26
Although the purpose of this Comment is not to educate the reader
on the archaic common law rules governing landlord-tenant relation-
ships, a brief examination of the development of these laws is helpful
in understanding the adoption of the implied warranty. 27
20. See infra notes 199-214 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 215-60 and accompanying text.
22. Caveat lessee, or "renter beware," refers to the common law approach to leases: the
renter took the premises as he found them and the landlord had no duty to repair defects on the
property. See Rabin, supra note 1, at 521. The opposite rule, referred to here as caveat lessor or
"landlord beware," places the burden of repairing rented premises upon the landlord. Id. at 522.
23. As comments to the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) noted in
1972, "Existing landlord-tenant law in the United States, save as modified by statute or judicial
interpretation, is a product of English common law developed within an agricultural society at a
time when doctrines of promissory contract were unrecognized." UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LAND-
LORD & TENANT Acr § 1.102 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 499 (2006) (amended 1974) [hereinafter URLTA].
24. See Rabin, supra note 1, at 519-20.
25. Id. ("In the last two decades we have experienced a revolution in residential landlord-
tenant law."); see also Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant
Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 503 (1982) ("It is generally acknowledged that the 1960's and 1970's
saw a revolution of sorts in American landlord-tenant law . . . ." (footnote omitted)).
26. Glendon, supra note 25, at 520.
27. For further examination of the early development of landlord-tenant law, see Hiram H.
Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279, 1279-81 (1961) [hereinafter Lesar,
Reform]; Hiram H. Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract
and Back in 900 Years?, 9 U. KAN. L. REv. 369, 369-72 (1960) [hereinafter Lesar, Perspective].
For thorough explanations of the development of modern landlord-tenant law in the United
States, see generally Glendon, supra note 25, at 203; Rabin, supra note 1, at 517.
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A. Formation of Landlord-Tenant Laws in the English
Common Law
Landlord-tenant laws began to take the form of what is now consid-
ered the common law perspective in approximately the fifteenth cen-
tury.28 At that time, most leases involved the use of agricultural
land. 29 Development of the common law reflected the nature of these
leases, which emphasized rights and obligations consistent with the
letting of land intended for agricultural use.30 Consistent with the
view that the purpose of a lease was to effect the transfer of land, the
common law regarded the lease as a conveyance of an ownership in-
terest in the land from the landlord to the tenant.31 The tenant there-
fore received a possessory estate and all rights and obligations that
accompanied ownership of this estate. 32 Due to the simplistic nature
of these rules, an increase in the use and intended purposes of leases
required further development of the rights and obligations that gov-
erned the landlord-tenant relationship. 33
In many instances, leases began to provide explicit covenants con-
cerning the rights and obligations of both the landlord and the ten-
ant.3 4 As leases increased to a level of complexity beyond that of a
simple grant of an estate in land, courts were called upon with increas-
ing frequency to further define the contours of the landlord-tenant
relationship.35 These courts determined that unless the covenant was
illegal, an express covenant of the parties always controlled the
lease.36 Where the lease instrument was devoid of covenants, courts
28. See Lesar, Perspective, supra note 27, at 371. The fifteenth century marked the starting
point of the "modern" common law rules governing landlord-tenant relationships. See id. Prior
to the fifteenth century, leases and the rules governing them were largely distinguishable from
their subsequent counterparts. See Lesar, Reform, supra note 27, at 1279.
29. See Glendon, supra note 25, at 506; Lesar, Perspective, supra note 27, at 371.
30. See Lesar, Perspective, supra note 27, at 371; Lesar, Reform, supra note 27, at 1280.
31. See Lesar, Reform, supra note 27, at 1280.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1281; see also GEOFFREY GILBERT, A TREATISE ON RENTs 1-7 (1758); Lesar,
Perspective, supra note 27, at 370.
34. Glendon, supra note 25, at 508; Lesar, Perspective, supra note 27, at 372.
35. GILBERT, supra note 33, at 34-35; Glendon, supra note 25, at 508; Lesar, Reform, supra
note 27, at 1281. A number of statutes were also enacted to formalize the most basic rules
governing leases and the obligations to pay rent. See Glendon, supra note 25, at 505.
36. Lesar, Reform, supra note 27, at 1281; see also H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT 498 (1st ed. 1884). Illegal covenants were those found to be contrary
to established law or public policy. WooD, supra, at 498, 952. Illegality of the purposes for
which premises were let would also bar a landlord from recovering unpaid rent because the
entirety of the lease would be void. Id.
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established certain basic implied covenants that governed all leases.37
One such implied covenant required landlords to provide possession
and quiet enjoyment of the land to the tenant.38 Another implied cov-
enant required tenants to pay rent on time, make minor repairs, and
abstain from committing waste by injuring the land.3 9 Courts uni-
formly found that the following covenants were never implied in
leases: fitness of the premises for the period of the lease,40 suitability
of the premises for the intended use,41 habitability of the premises,42
and the duty of the landlord to maintain the premises or make repairs
of any kind.43
Common law courts viewed leases as conveyances of land rather
than bilateral contracts.44 Under this perspective, covenants between
the landlord and tenant were considered mutually independent. 45
While the landlord held some rights in the event of nonpayment of
rent,46 the tenant lacked corresponding rights in the event of the land-
lord's breach.47 Therefore, the tenant remained liable for payment of
rent in the event of the landlord's breach of any covenant of the lease,
short of actual eviction. 48 Furthermore, because the conveyance was
37. These basic implied covenants were those that arose naturally from the theory that a lease
was a conveyance of an ownership interest in land. See WOOD, supra note 36, at 517; Glendon,
supra note 25, at 510-11.
38. GILBERT, supra note 33, at 148; see also Lesar, Perspective, supra note 27, at 371; Glendon,
supra note 25, at 510.
39. Glendon, supra note 25, at 510-11; Lesar, Reform, supra note 27, at 1280.
40. See, e.g., Witty v. Matthews, 52 N.Y. 512, 514 (1873) (noting that fitness of the premises for
the lease period is only guaranteed by express contract); see also WOOD, supra note 36, at 613;
Glendon, supra note 25, at 510.
41. See, e.g., Banks v. White, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 613, 614 (1854) (finding that a flood that
rendered the property unsuitable for the use intended did not provide a defense for a tenant who
abandoned the land and ceased payment of rent); see also Lesar, Reform, supra note 27, at 1280.
42. See, e.g., Banks, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) at 614 (noting that the uninhabitable state of a rented
house is not a defense against an action for nonpayment of rent); see also Lesar, Perspective,
supra note 27, at 373.
43. See, e.g., Libbey v. Tolford, 48 Me. 316, 316 (1861) (noting that a landlord has no obliga-
tion to make repairs unless he contracts to do so); see also WOOD, supra note 36, at 607; Glen-
don, supra note 25, at 510-11.
44. Lesar, Reform, supra note 27, at 1284.
45. Wooo, supra note 36, at 509; Lesar, Perspective, supra note 27, at 374. The concept of
mutually dependent covenants first began under contract law in the eighteenth century; how-
ever, courts remained reticent to apply contract principles to leases of land. See Glendon, supra
note 25, at 511.
46. Important rights granted to landlords included the right to sue a tenant for unpaid rent
and the right to evict the tenant. See GILBERT, supra note 33, at 16-18; Lesar, Perspective, supra
note 27, at 371.
47. Glendon, supra note 25, at 511; Lesar, Perspective, supra note 27, at 374.
48. See, e.g., Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 63, 63-66 (1809) (holding that a tenant remained
liable for rent payments despite the landlord's breach of a covenant to build a chocolate mill);
see also WOOD, supra note 36, at 612, 793; Glendon, supra note 25, at 511.
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of an interest in land, so long as the land remained, the lessee's obliga-
tion to pay rent persisted.49 Even where the entirety of the leased
land became flooded and unusable, the estate persisted, albeit several
feet under water, and the tenant remained liable for payment of
rent.50
B. Application of the English Common Law in American
Landlord-Tenant Law
Although the common law rules governing the landlord-tenant re-
lationship were subject to criticism by U.S. courts throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they remained relatively un-
changed.51 Attempts to reform the common law through legislation
provided some reprieve for tenants, but the common law perspective
remained largely unshaken.52
Beginning in the nineteenth century, a number of states adopted
housing codes that required landlords to maintain residential housing
at a specified minimum standard; however, these codes rarely pro-
vided a private remedy for tenants.53 Where the legislation did pro-
vide tenants with private remedies, 54 judicial decisions commonly
limited and further restricted the scope of available remedies.55 Even
when tenants were freed from the obligation to pay rent in the event
that their residence was uninhabitable or entirely destroyed, they
were required to vacate the premises prior to cessation of rent pay-
49. GILBERT, supra note 33, at 154; WOOD, supra note 36, at 631; Glendon, supra note 25, at
511.
50. See, e.g., Niedelet v. Wales, 16 Mo. 214, 214-15 (1852) (tenant could not defend nonpay-
ment of rent on the basis of flooding of the residence); see also WooD, supra note 36, at 631.
51. See Lesar, Perspective, supra note 27, at 372; Lesar, Reform, supra note 27, at 1289.
52. See Lesar, Reform, supra note 27, at 1286.
53. See id. An 1867 New York statute required that "tenement" housing in New York City
meet certain building codes; however, tenants did not have a private right of action to enforce
the statute. See Tenement House Act, 1867 N.Y. Laws ch. 908. Prior to the 1960s, several other
states adopted statutes similar to that of New York. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT REV. § 4050
(1949) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 47a-51 (2006)); IOWA CODE § 413.39-66
(1939) (repealed 1980).
54. WOOD, supra note 36, at 616-18; Glendon, supra note 25, at 516. In 1872, California
adopted a statute requiring landlords to maintain residential rental property in "a condition fit
for . . . occupation." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (1872) (amended 1873-74); see also MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42-201 (1947); N.D. REV. CODE § 47-1612 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 31
(1954).
55. See WOOD, supra note 36, at 617; Glendon, supra note 25, at 516. Tenants' remedies, when
not waived entirely, were typically limited to the repair of defects or complete abandonment of
the premises. See, e.g., Arnold v. Krigbaum, 146 P. 423 (Cal. 1915) (refusing to allow a tenant to
withhold rent when a landlord failed to maintain the premises); Sieber v. Blanc, 18 P. 260 (Cal.
1888).
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ments. 56 Therefore, the right to withhold rent was contingent not only
on the condition of the premises, but also on the tenant's complete
evacuation of the premises.57
C Adoption of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Between the end of World War II and the late 1960s, land-
lord-tenant laws became the focus of greater attention from state
courts, state legislatures, and the U.S. government. Following swift
increases in urbanization, a population explosion, and greater con-
cerns for social welfare, the U.S. government and various state legisla-
tures began emphasizing policies of affordability and habitability in
housing.58 These policy concerns, combined with both legislation that
modified the common law and an increased societal concern for eq-
uity in landlord-tenant relationships, led to the revolution in land-
lord-tenant law. 59
1. Judicial Adoption of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Beginning in the late 1950s, a number of jurisdictions began ex-
panding the number and scope of implied obligations placed upon
landlords. 60 Early cases were typically limited to tort liability for inju-
ries suffered by a tenant,61 or imputation of an implied warranty of
habitability in situations involving constructive eviction. 62 Pines v.
56. Glendon, supra note 25, at 517. The requirement that a tenant vacate the premises was
based upon the principle that the condition of the premises had to reach the level of "construc-
tive eviction." See WooD, supra note 36, at 798; Glendon, supra note 25, at 513; see also Burn-
stine v. Margulies, 87 A.2d 37, 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952).
57. See, e.g., Palumbo v. Olympia Theatres, Inc., 176 N.E. 815, 816 (Mass. 1931) (holding that
the tenant's failure to vacate the premises within a reasonable time precluded a claim of con-
structive eviction); De Witt v. Pierson, 112 Mass. 8, 10 (1873) (holding that the tenant must
"yield[] the possession within a reasonable time").
58. For a survey of the housing problems and legislative policies that gave rise to the implied
warranty, see Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also
Green v. Superior Court of S.F., 517 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Cal. 1974); Rabin, supra note 1, at 543-44.
59. See Rabin, supra note 1, at 543-44.
60. See, e.g., Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (permitting a negligence
claim against a landlord for failure to maintain the premises despite the absence of an express
covenant establishing such a duty).
61. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Taylor, 174 S.W.2d 844, 847-49 (Mo. 1943) (permitting a negligence
claim against a landlord for failure to maintain the premises despite the absence of an express
covenant establishing such a duty); Daniels v. Brunton, 80 A.2d 547, 549-51 (N.J. 1951) (same);
see also Glendon, supra note 25, at 517.
62. See, e.g., Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 163 N.E.2d 4, 6-7 (Mass. 1959)
(permitting a constructive eviction defense to an action for unpaid rent when the premises were
shown to be uninhabitable); Buckner v. Azulai, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806, 807-08 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1967) (same). The constructive eviction defense required that a tenant entirely vacate
the premises before ceasing rent payments. See Glendon, supra note 25, at 517. Development of
the implied warranty and the corresponding right to withhold rent without vacating the premises
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Perssion63 is generally understood to be one of the earliest cases that
explicitly invoked the implied warranty. 64 While Pines was limited to
the requirement that a landlord maintain a fully furnished dwelling in
a habitable condition,65 the language of the case was soon echoed by
courts adopting a broad implied warranty of habitability. 66
In 1969, the Hawaii Supreme Court opened a floodgate with its de-
cision in Lemle v. Breeden.67 In Lemle, the court broke the fetters of
common law and held that a warranty of habitability was implied in all
residential leases. 6 8 Not stopping there, the court held that contract
law should govern the lease; therefore, the landlord's breach of the
warranty freed the tenant from the obligation to pay rent, regardless
of whether the tenant had evacuated the premises.69 Within one year,
New Jersey and a federal court in the District of Columbia followed
suit with Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper and Javins v. First National Re-
alty Corp.70
was, in part, intended to ameliorate the strict requirements and harsh effects of the constructive
eviction doctrine. See Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (Haw. 1969).
63. Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961). In Pines, the court determined that the
landlord had breached an implied warranty of habitability by renting a "filthy" house that vio-
lated numerous building codes. Id. at 411, 413. The court reached this determination by adopt-
ing an exception to the general rule of caveat emptor: a warranty of habitability was implied in
the lease of a furnished house. Id. at 412.
64. See Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.U. L. REV. 405, 413
(2002); Rabin, supra note 1, at 552.
65. Pines, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
66. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court of S.F., 517 P.2d 1168, 1175 (Cal. 1974); Bos. Hous.
Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d
268, 273 (N.J. 1969).
67. Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969). The Lemle court adopted the implied war-
ranty of habitability and rejected any requirement that a tenant vacate the premises to recover.
Id. at 475. Although the landlord in Lemle had not violated any building codes, the court deter-
mined that a rat infestation constituted a violation of the implied warranty. Id. at 476. This
decision emphasized the role of habitability, as opposed to code violations, in determining
whether a breach of the implied warranty had occurred. Id.
68. Id. at 474. The Lemle court reasoned that the doctrine of caveat lessee was no longer
sound in a modern urban society where tenants bargained for and expected a home for immedi-
ate occupation. Id. at 473. Therefore, adoption of an implied warranty gave recognition to the
modern realities of leases and landlord-tenant relationships. Id. at 474.
69. Id. at 475-76.
70. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Reste Realty Corp.,
251 A.2d at 276-77. Although Lemle was the first case to fully adopt the implied warranty of
habitability, Javins is widely considered the seminal case on the issue. See ROBERT S. SCHOSHIN-
SKI, AMERICAN LAw OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 124 (1980); Glendon, supra note 25, at 521,
525; Rabin, supra note 1, at 522. In Javins, the court held that a warranty of habitability was
implied in all residential leases. 428 F.2d at 1072-73. The implied warranty was measured by
local housing codes, and any violation of these codes constituted a breach of the warranty. Id.
Rabin criticized the use of Javins by courts adopting "a true implied warranty" because the court
in Javins dealt with a code-imposed duty. Rabin, supra note 1, at 525. He argued that Lemle,
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Although a few courts expressly declined to imply a warranty of
habitability into residential leases,71 the majority of courts that consid-
ered the issue over the next decade adopted the rationales and hold-
ings of Lemle, Reste, and Javins.72 In doing so, these courts
recognized the increase in federal and state legislation that empha-
sized a desire to provide adequate housing for all tenants.73 Because
of the ignorance of the modern tenant with regard to home repairs
and the increasing complexity of modern housing, courts rejected the
expectation that a tenant would understand defects prior to signing a
lease or be able to repair defects upon discovery.74 According to
these courts' decisions, further support for adoption of the implied
warranty was provided by the scarcity of adequate housing, unequal
bargaining power in lease creation, and the expectation of all tenants
that their leased housing would be habitable.75
In rejecting the strict view of a lease as a conveyance, courts empha-
sized that the modern lease was no longer a simple conveyance of
land.7 6 Instead, tenants were leasing residential property, commonly a
single apartment in a large complex, for the sole purpose of obtaining
dealing with a breach of the warranty in luxury housing, is the best early example of the true
implied warranty. See id.
71. See Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 558 P.2d 563, 565 (Colo. 1976) ("We have concluded that,
however desirable the adoption of the rule of implied warranty of habitability might be, the
resolution of this issue is more properly the function of the General Assembly."); Posnanski v.
Hood, 174 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Wis. 1970) ("[T]he defendant does not have an affirmative defense
based upon alleged violations of the Milwaukee Housing Code . . . .").
72. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court of S.F., 517 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Cal. 1974); Jack Spring, Inc.
v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304 (Kan. 1974); Bos. Hous.
Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Rome v. Walker, 196 N.W.2d 850 (Mich.
1972); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978); see also ScHOSHINSKI, supra note 70, at
126.
73. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1081 n.57 ("The housing and sanitary codes, especially in light
of Congress' explicit direction for their enactment, indicate a strong and pervasive congressional
concern to secure for the city's slum dwellers decent, or at least safe and sanitary, places to live."
(quoting Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968))); Green, 517 P.2d at 1175 (noting
California's legislative attempts to increase adequacy of housing); see also Rabin, supra note 1, at
543.
74. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1078-79; Green, 517 P.2d at 1173; Lemle, 462 P.2d at 474;
Reste Realty Corp., 251 A.2d at 272. As the court in Green stated,
[T]he increasing complexity of modern apartment buildings not only renders them
much more difficult and expensive to repair than the living quarters of earlier days, but
also makes adequate inspection of the premises by a prospective tenant a virtual impos-
sibility; complex heating, electrical and plumbing systems are hidden from view, and
the landlord, who has had experience with the building, is certainly in a much better
position to discover and to cure dilapidations in the premises.
517 P.2d at 1173.
75. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079; Green, 517 P.2d at 1173-75.
76. See Green, 517 P.2d at 1171-72; Lernle, 462 P.2d at 473.
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shelter.77 Construction of the lease as a conveyance in land was in-
compatible with the actual use of the modern lease; instead, leases
were best understood as bilateral contracts.78 Therefore, following
the Lemle example, courts held that tenants' remedies were available
upon a breach by the landlord, regardless of whether the tenant had
vacated the premises.79
2. Legislative Adoption of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Despite several early attempts by state legislatures to increase ten-
ant rights and decrease the amount of substandard housing,80 there
existed a prevailing perception that these statutes were ineffective.8 '
Following the increase in judicial adoption of the implied warranty
and the creation of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
(URLTA), 82 many states began the process of enacting comprehen-
sive landlord-tenant legislation. 83
The URLTA, established in 1972, represented the first major at-
tempt to create uniform landlord-tenant legislation that fundamen-
tally differed from the common law.8 4 Recognizing the "warranty of
habitability doctrine," the URLTA enumerated a number of obliga-
tions to be implied upon all residential landlords.85 These obligations
required, in part, that all residential landlords
(1) comply with the requirements of applicable building and hous-
ing codes materially affecting health and safety;
(2) make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep
the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe
condition;
77. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1078 ("Today's urban tenants, the vast majority of whom live
in multiple dwelling houses, are interested, not in the land, but solely in 'a house suitable for
occupation."'); Green, 517 P.2d at 1172.
78. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075, 1079; Green, 517 P.2d at 1172-73, 1180-81; Lemle, 462
P.2d at 473; Reste Realty Corp., 251 A.2d at 272, 276.
79. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083 n.67; Green, 517 P.2d at 1181; Lemle, 462 P.2d at 475-76;
see also SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 70, at 136-37.
80. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 4050 (1949) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT.
REv. § 47a-51 (2006)); IOWA CODE § 413.39-.66 (1939) (repealed 1980).
81. See Rabin, supra note 1, at 546.
82. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT, § 1.102 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 499 (2006)
(amended 1974).
83. See ScHOSHINSKI, supra note 70, at 150-51; Glendon, supra note 25, at 523; Rabin, supra
note 1, at 527.
84. The only prior attempt to accomplish this feat, the American Law Institute's Model Resi-
dential Landlord and Tenant Code, was converted into the URLTA in 1972. See Glendon, supra
note 25, at 523 n.134.




(4) maintain in good and safe working order and condition all elec-
trical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning,
and other facilities and appliances, including elevators, supplied
or required to be supplied by him . . . .86
Furthermore, landlords were required to maintain certain basic utili-
ties.87 In the event that a landlord breached a duty, the URLTA pro-
vided the tenant with a number of remedies that reached far beyond
the scope of those traditionally available.88
Despite concerns that the URLTA was "decidedly pro-tenant legis-
lation," 89 it became the foundation for the flood of comprehensive
legislative reforms that followed. 90 By 1984, more than forty states
had adopted the implied warranty by statute. 91 Of these, roughly one-
half were modeled on the URLTA.92 Where the URLTA was not
adopted, states adapted existing code requirements and added new
statutory remedies for tenants, effectively allowing tenants to refuse
to make rent payments or defend nonpayment of rent on the basis of
code violations.93 By the mid-1980s, therefore, a large majority of
states had increased tenants' rights, imputing upon all residential land-
lords an obligation to maintain their premises in a habitable state. 94
D. Current Status of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Following the flood of legislative adoptions of the implied warranty
before 1984, states that had not revised their legislation remained slow
to do so. Today, however, forty-nine states have adopted some form
of the implied warranty and corresponding tenants' rights.95 The only
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See URLTA § 4.101, 7B U.L.A. at 375 (allowing tenant to terminate the lease agreement),
§ 4.103 (allowing tenant to make minor repairs and deduct the cost from future rent payments),
§ 4.104 (allowing tenant to recover damages for landlord's failure to provide essential services),
§ 4.105 (allowing tenant to claim landlord's noncompliance as a defense to an action based on
nonpayment of rent); see also SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 70, at 154-55.
89. Samuel Jan Brakel et al., URLTA in Operation: The Oregon Experience, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 565, 567 ("Though it also spells out in substantial detail the landlord's rights and
remedies, the act-in comparison to what was before-is decidedly pro-tenant legislation.").
90. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 70, at 150-52; Glendon, supra note 25, at 523; Rabin, supra
note 1, at 527.
91. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 70, at 150; Rabin, supra note 1, at 527.
92. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 70, at 152; Glendon, supra note 25, at 523.
93. See Glendon, supra note 25, at 523.
94. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 70, at 150 (listing states); Rabin, supra note 1, at 527.
95. See ALA. CODE § 35-9A-204 (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100, .106 (2009); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33-1324, -1361 (2008); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941, 1941.1, 1942 (West 2008); COLo.
REV. STAT. § 38-12-503 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-7 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25,
§ 5305 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.51, 83.56 (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-13 (2009);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 521-42, 521-61 to 66 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-320 (2008); IND. CODE
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state not to adopt the implied warranty is Arkansas, where state law
requires that tenants take affirmative steps to maintain residential
premises at standards set by housing codes. 96
Although landlords' obligations and tenants' rights vary by state,
they remain largely the same as those enumerated under the URLTA.
The principal requirement of the modern implied warranty is that the
premises remain in a "habitable state."97 As this is typically measured
by reference to code violations, 98 the general effect of the implied
warranty in all states is to provide tenants with statutory rights in the
event of a landlord's noncompliance with local housing codes. 99 Be-
yond the requirement that the premises remain habitable, a landlord's
obligations are limited in some states and broad in others.100 Typi-
cally, tenants can defend their nonpayment of rent on the basis of a
ANN. § 32-31-8-5 (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.12 to .16 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-2553 (2008); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. H§ 383.595, 383.625, 383.635 to .645 (West 2009); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3221 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (2008); MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP. § 8-211 (LexisNexis 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (2009); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 554.139 (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.161 (West 2008); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 89-8-23 (2008); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.234 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303
(2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1419, 76-1425 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.290 (2009); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 540:13-d, 48-A:14 (2008); N.J. STAT. § 2A:42-96 (West 2009); N.M. STAT.
§ 47-8-1 to -51 (2008); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42
(2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04, .07 (2009);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 108 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 90.320, 90.360-375 (2007); 35 PA.
CONS. ANN. § 1700-1 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-16 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-
440 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-32-8 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304 (2009); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052 (Vernon 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-3 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, H§ 4457-4458 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13, .25 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 59.18.060 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-30 (2008); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 2009);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1202 (2009). See also Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208, 213-17
(1972) (recognizing an implied warranty of habitability in Illinois common law).
96. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-601 (Supp. 2009). The Arkansas code requires that tenants
"[c]omply with all obligations primarily imposed upon tenants by applicable provisions of build-
ing and housing codes materially affecting health and safety." § 18-17-601(1).
97. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 32-31-8-5 (requiring that residential landlords "[d]eliver the rental
premises ... in a safe, clean, and habitable condition"); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.060 ("The
landlord will at all times during the tenancy keep the premises fit for human habitation . . . .").
98. The URLTA explicitly requires compliance "with the requirements of applicable building
and housing codes materially affecting health and safety." UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND
TENANT Acr, § 2.104(a)(1), 7B U.L.A. 326 (2006) (amended 1974).
99. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1(1)(a) (landlords must "[c]omply with the require-
ments of applicable building and housing codes materially affecting health and safety"); see also
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (using housing codes
as the standard for determining whether there has been a breach of the implied warranty).
100. Some states require only basic maintenance to the extent necessary to ensure health and
safety. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-503(2)(b). Other states require more involved main-
tenance and provision of utilities such as air conditioning. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-9A-
204(a)(4) ("A landlord shall ... maintain in good and safe working order and condition all
electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities and appli-
ances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by the landlord . . . .").
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landlord's breach and can also deduct the cost of minor repairs from
rent.10' The scope and cost of permissible repairs, however, varies
greatly between states.102
For the purposes of this Comment, the one relevant variation in
state laws is the tenant's ability to waive the implied warranty. Today,
there are three general approaches to waiver; states have adopted
these approaches in roughly even numbers.103 The first approach per-
mits a limited waiver of the warranty: the tenant may waive the land-
lord's duty to repair except with regard to repairs that are necessary to
cure code violations or maintain the premises in a habitable state.104
The second approach permits a full waiver; however, the waiver must
generally be express, written, and supported by consideration. 0 5 The
final approach bans all waivers of the warranty. 06
Through judicial and legislative adoption, the implied warranty has
replaced the common law doctrine of caveat lessee in the majority of
residential leases. 07 This trend did not go unnoticed in the field of
legal academia; indeed, the implied warranty has received a great deal
of academic attention over the past forty years. 0 Today, academic
literature regarding the implied warranty commonly focuses on ex-
pansion of the doctrine into commercial leases and other residential
dwellings.109 Although the times and circumstances have changed
since Lemle and Javins, the underlying arguments remain largely the
same.110
101. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 239, § 8A.
102. Compare id. (tenant may deduct four months' rent), with Mo. REV. STAT. § 441.234 (ten-
ant may deduct the greater of $300 or one-half month's rent). These variations, though impor-
tant for practitioners, are less important for the purposes of this Comment than is the
recognition of the widespread acceptance of basic obligations and rights in the modern land-
lord-tenant statutory schemes.
103. EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 80 (6th ed.
2011).
104. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-7(c)-(d) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-42(b)(1)-(3)
(2008); see also RABIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 80.
105. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 83.51(1)(b) (2009); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-8-23(3) (2008); Wyo.
STAT. AN. § 1-21-1202(d) (2008); see also RABIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 80.
106. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-503(5) (2008); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 127L
(2009); Wis. STAT. § 704.07(1) (2008); see also RABIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 80.
107. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 2-3, 8-13 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Daniel B. Bogart, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Leasing: The
Right Doctrine in the Wrong Transaction, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 275 (2008); Christopher S.
Brennan, The Next Step in the Evolution of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: Applying the
Warranty to Condominiums, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (1999).
110. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 109, at 3064-69 (arguing for the extension of the implied
warranty to condominiums).
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E. Academic Reactions to the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Prior to the wave of judicial decisions and statute enactments that
implied a warranty of habitability into residential leases, most acade-
micians championed adoption of the implied warranty and provided
the literature on which many courts relied in their decisions.111 In-
deed, major criticisms of the implied warranty did not emerge from
the legal economists until several years after Lemle.n 2 Using varia-
tions on the basic concept of supply and demand, both the champions
and the critics predicted the results they expected would follow the
strict housing code enforcement that arose as a result of the adoption
of the implied warranty.
1. Champions of the Cause
Bruce Ackerman is generally regarded as a leader among those aca-
demicians who argued for code enforcement on an economic basis. 113
In an attempt to allay the fears of increased rents that were delaying
widespread acceptance of strict code enforcement, Ackerman devised
an abstract analysis of the effects of these laws on slum housing.1 1 4
Under Ackerman's hypothetical situation, comprehensive code en-
forcement would increase overall housing quality but would not de-
crease the available housing stock."i5 Therefore, residents would not
engage in competition for housing and the only rent increases would
be due to landlords' attempts to pass on increased costs.11 6 Further-
more, Ackerman argued that rents would remain stagnant if lower in-
come tenants did not sufficiently value the code-required
improvements or did not have the means to pay increased rents.117 In
this situation, he believed that tenants would simply "pair up and
111. See, e.g., Myron Moskovitz, Rent Withholding and the Implied Warranty of Habitability-
Some New Breakthroughs, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 49 (1970); Robert S. Schoshinski, Remedies
of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966); Frank F. Skillern, Implied
Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENv. L.J. 387 (1967).
112. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 259-63; Meyers, supra note 11, at 889-90, 893.
113. See Kennedy, supra note 13, at 498; Rabin, supra note 1, at 559.
114. See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1095.
115. Id. at 1104-05. In this scenario, Ackerman assumed that although most landlords would
earn a low return rate on rental units, they would not abandon their rental property. Id. at
1103-04. This hypothetical model excluded any truly poverty-stricken or exploitative landlords.
Id. Under this model, Ackerman reasoned that abandonment would be irrational for the aver-
age landlord despite receipt of a low return on his original investment. Id. This assumption was
one of the primary bases for criticisms of Ackerman's model. See, e.g., Komesar, supra note 11,
at 1187. Ackerman also examined hypothetical models where abandonment did occur. See Ack-
erman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1111-12. Because these models examine
variables outside of the scope of this Comment, they are not discussed here.
116. See id. at 1105.
117. Id. at 1105-07.
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share apartments."' 1 8 Therefore, Ackerman concluded, under this
analysis of the hypothetical "average slum," code enforcement could
feasibly have a negligible effect on rent.119
Writing seventeen years after Ackerman, Duncan Kennedy posited
an even more extreme hypothesis: an implied warranty of habitability
could depress rent rates. 120 First discussing landlord "milking" of
housing,1 21 Kennedy argued that code enforcement could extend the
average life of housing by decreasing the rate at which older buildings
were permitted to deteriorate.122 Although abandonment would still
occur when the cost of repair exceeded the amount tenants were will-
ing to pay for rent, prevention of premature milking could slow the
rate of abandonment. 123 Therefore, Kennedy argued, it was possible
that the quantity of low-income housing would not decrease at all; as a
result, "bidding wars" would not lead to increased rent rates.124 Fur-
thermore, as housing continued to "filter" down from high-rent status
to low-rent status,125 it was possible that the quantity of low-rent hous-
ing would increase, with the result of actually depressing rent rates for
all rental housing. 126 Although Kennedy was unwilling to argue that a
depression of rent would in fact occur, he concluded that it was an
entirely plausible result of strict code enforcement.127
Ackerman and Kennedy were not alone in positing that the implied
warranty might not lead to increased rental rates.128 They were also
not alone in admitting that given certain circumstances outside of
their analysis, rent rates could rise.129 Without empirical data to sup-
118. Id. at 1105-06.
119. Id. at 1105, 1108.
120. Kennedy, supra note 13, at 500, 506.
121. "[M]ilking [is] the decision to reduce maintenance below the level necessary to keep a
building in existence as a residential unit. . . . [T]he milking landlord treats his property as a
wasting rather than a renewable asset." Id. at 489.
122. See id at 500, 505.
123. Id. at 502-03.
124. Id. at 500, 505.
125. "The filtering process involves steady decline in the value of existing housing, as new
housing is built and lower income people move upward through the neighborhood chain." Id. at
487. "As higher income people build new housing for themselves in the suburbs, lower income
people 'filter up' through the existing stock, so that today's poor often live in housing built for an
earlier middle class." Id. at 486.
126. See id. at 500, 505. High-quality low-rent housing could require medium-rent landlords
to ask for lower rents or risk the loss of medium-income tenants to low-rent housing. Id. at 504.
127. Id. at 506. Although Kennedy found it "perfectly possible" that rents would be de-
pressed, he concluded that "[m]icroeconomic theory at this level of abstraction cannot tell us
what to expect." Id.
128. See generally Craswell, supra note 13, at 361; Markovits, supra note 13, at 1815.
129. See Craswell, supra note 13, at 362.
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port their hypotheses, these proponents of code enforcement left their
critics with ample ground for continued debate.130
2. Criticism and Concern over the Potential "Backlash"
Writing in response to the American Law Institute's acceptance of
the implied warranty,131 Charles Meyers contended that the warranty
would result in a shortage of low-income housing and increase in aver-
age rental rates.132 Meyers argued that in many cases, an increase in
code enforcement would make the cost of repairing low-income hous-
ing excessive relative to potential profits.133 Therefore, landlords
would abandon the housing, decreasing the available housing stock.134
Where housing could be repaired at a reasonable cost, rent rates
would increase in markets conducive to such increases.'3 5 A rent hike
would displace lower income tenants, thereby increasing the demand
for low-rent housing.136 Where it was either not necessary or not fea-
sible to raise rent following repairs, the housing would turn a lower
profit and would be retired more quickly.137 In all situations, Meyers
argued, the inevitable combined result was a decrease in the supply of
low-rent housing and an increase in the demand for it.138
Judge Richard Posner's critique of the implied warranty was similar
to that of Charles Meyers; however, Posner placed greater emphasis
on the role of supply and demand in concluding that the implied war-
ranty would harm low-income tenants.139 In accord with Meyers, Pos-
ner argued that the small profit margin in low-income housing would
lead to higher rates of landlord abandonment under strict code en-
forcement. 140 Posner predicted that abandonment would necessarily
lead to a smaller supply of low-income housing.141 The effects of sup-
ply and demand would then become a force that drove up housing
prices, even if the landlord was not incurring substantial costs to re-
130. See Hillman, supra note 5, at 842.
131. Meyers was specifically responding to the American Law Institute's tentative draft for
the Restatement (Second) of Property. Meyers, supra note 11, at 897.
132. Id. at 889-90, 903.
133. Id. at 889.
134. Id. at 892. Meyers utilized prior examinations of landlord abandonment rates to support
this argument. Id. at 893-97.
135. Id. at 889-90.
136. See id. at 893.
137. Id. at 889-91.
138. Id. at 893.
139. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 259-63.
140. Id. at 260. Posner also noted that landlords who could upgrade from low-income housing
to middle-income housing for a nominal extra cost might do so, further depleting the availability




pair the housing. 142 Low-rent housing, generally in better condition
due to code enforcement, would become a highly sought-after com-
modity.143 Under this model, a simultaneous decrease in the housing
supply and increase in the housing demand would result in bidding
wars.144 Tenants with higher incomes could receive better housing at
lower rates, and lower income tenants would be required to pay
higher rent rates in order to competitively "bid" on available hous-
ing.145 The inevitable result, Posner argued, would be to raise the av-
erage rental rates, thereby harming low-income tenants.146
A 1975 study led by Werner Hirsch utilized regression analyses to
examine the relationship between specific habitability laws and rent
rates.147 The implied warranty was not examined; however, repair and
deduct laws,148 retaliatory eviction laws,149 and receivership laws 50
were used as independent variables that represented habitability laws
generally. 15' Although all of the habitability laws had a positive rela-
tionship with higher rent, only receivership had a statistically signifi-
cant relationship. 152 Contrary to Ackerman's arguments regarding
code enforcement, the authors found that the existence of receiver-
ship laws resulted, on average, in 12% higher rental rates. 53 It was
posited that the lack of a significant relationship between rent and the
other laws was due to either non-use of these remedies or absorption
of increased costs by select groups of tenants.154 Even without regard
for those variables, however, the authors concluded that the increased
costs to landlords brought about by habitability laws were, to a de-
gree, passed on to tenants.155





147. Hirsch et al., supra note 14, at 1098. In this study, the majority of the rental data was
taken from 1972. Id. at 1128.
148. Repair and deduct laws permit tenants to repair material defects in their housing; the
cost of these repairs can then be deducted from subsequent rent payments. Id. at 1104.
149. Retaliatory eviction laws provide tenants with a cause of action when they are evicted by
a landlord due to the assertion of statutory rights or the reporting of code violations. Id. at 1113.
150. Receivership laws enable court-appointed receivers to take control of leased properties
and then correct serious code violations. Id. at 1111.
151. Id. at 1128.
152. Id. at 1129.
153. Id. at 1130. The average rent difference between states with receivership laws and those
without was $125 per year. Id. at 1129.
154. Id. at 1130-32.
155. See id. at 1140.
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F. A Need for Further Examination
In the past decade and a half, few authors have undertaken efforts
to examine, even on a theoretical basis, the debate over the implied
warranty. 156 While articles mentioning the debate or calling for fur-
ther expansion of tenants' remedies are not uncommon, authors have
widely avoided entering the debate over economic effects.157 Empiri-
cal studies of the implied warranty have focused on other issues, such
as the efficacy of these laws when tenants seek remedies. 58 While
theoretical assumptions and an early regression analysis sufficiently
framed the debate for a number of years, it seems that ample time has
passed to warrant, if not necessitate, further empirical study.
III. ANALYSIS
This Comment presents the results of four distinct analyses in-
tended to provide, at a minimum, some level of empirical evidence
regarding the effects of the implied warranty. These analyses used
data that spanned the thirty-three-year period from 1974 to 2007 in
order to examine the relationship between the implied warranty and
rent rates. Although the findings were not as overwhelming as critics
of the implied warranty expected, the results did indicate that the im-
plied warranty raised rent rates.159
Four separate analyses were conducted on the data after the com-
pletion of data preparation. The first, an annual regression analysis,
examined the relationship between the implied warranty and rent
rates on an annual basis.160 The second, a regression analysis of the
impact of an ability to waive the warranty, examined the relationship
between waiver and rent rates.161 The third, a regression analysis of
changes over time, examined the relationship between the implied
warranty and the increase in rent rates over a period of years.162 The
156. See Hillman, supra note 5, at 842; Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1876.
157. See, e.g., David I. Blower, Comment, Colorado HB 1061 and Advocating for the End of
Caveat Emptor in Residential Leases, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 957 (2007); Stephen J. Maddex, Note,
Propst v. McNeill- Arkansas Landlord-Tenant Law, A Time for Change, 51 ARK. L. REV. 575
(1998); Krista L. Noonan & Frederick M. Preator, Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: It
Is Time to Bury the Beast Known as Caveat Emptor, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 329 (1998).
158. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 865
(2004).
159. See infra Part IV.A.1.
160. See infra Part III.B.1.a.
161. See infra Part III.B.1.b.
162. See infra Part III.B.1.c.
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fourth, an analysis of housing conditions, examined the relationship
between the implied warranty and negative housing conditions. 163
A. Data and Variables Used
A majority of the data used in the analyses came from surveys con-
ducted by the American Housing Survey (AHS). 164 These annual
surveys collect information about American households through re-
sponses to various questions intended to examine household
demographics, housing quality, and neighborhood conditions. Most of
the data in this analysis was transcribed directly from original AHS
data sets. Several additional variables used values computed from
AHS data.165 All other data used in the analyses came from the au-
thor's research. 166 Figure 1 contains a full list of the variables used
and their respective sources.
FIGURE 1: VARIABLES-DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES
Variable Abbreviation Source Used In1 6 7
Percentage Change in State's Bottom %25RENT Computed from Analysis 3Quartile Rent Rate AHS Data
Percentage Change in State's Median %AMTTX Computed from Analysis 3Property Tax AHS Data
Percentage Change in State's Median %MDINC Computed from AnalysisIncome AHS Data
Percentage Change in State's Median Rent %MDRENT Computed from Analysis 3Rate AHS Data
Percentage Change in State's Median %MDRINC Computed from Analysis 3
Renter Income AHS Data
Percentage Change in State's Median %VALUE Computed from Analysis 3Property Value AHS Data
Abandoned Buildings Near Dwelling ABAND AHS Data Analysis 1,2
Central Air Conditioning Unit AIR AHS Data Analysis 1,
_____________ 2, 4
163. See infra Part III.B.2.
164. AHS data from 1997 to 2009 is available electronically through the U.S. Census Bureau
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. See American Housing Survey, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, www.census.gov/hhes/www/housinglahs/ahs.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011);
Data Sets, HUD USER, www.huduser.org/DATASETS/ahs.html (last visited Mar. 9,2011). Data
from 1974 through 2004 can be purchased in DVD format through the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. See AHS Data Available on CD-ROM, HUD USER, http://www.
huduser.org/DATASETSlahs/ahscd.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
165. See infra Part III.A.1.
166. See id.
167. "Analysis 1" refers to the annual implied warranty analysis. "Analysis 2" refers to the
annual waiver analysis. "Analysis 3" refers to the analysis of changes over time. "Analysis 4"
refers to the housing-conditions analysis.
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Median State Mortgage Value AMTMORT Computed from Analysis 1,AHS Data 2
Median State Property Tax AMTTX Computed from Analysis 1,AHS Data 2
Number of Bathrooms BATHS Computed from Analysis 1,AHS Data 2
Number of Bedrooms BDRMS AHS Data Analysis 1,2
Existence of a Cellar CELLAR AHS Data Analysis 1,2
Open Cracks Wider Than a Dime CRACKS AHS Data Ana2ysis 1,
Total Number of Negative Housing DEFECTS Computed from Analysis 4Conditions AHS Data
Building Has an Elevator ELEV AHS Data Analysis 1,2
Dwelling Has a Garage GARAGE AHS Data Analysis 1,2
Holes in Dwelling Walls HOLES AHS Data Analysis 1,Hole in wellng Wlls2, 4
Household Income INC AHS Data Analysis 1,2
Existence/Nonuse of the Implied Warranty IWH Author's Analysis 1,Research 3, 4
State Median Income MDINC Computed from Analysis 1,
AHS Data 2
State Median Income of Renters MDRINC Computed from Analysis 1,AHS Data 2
Cracks in Wall Plaster PLASTER AHS Data Analysis 1,2, 4
Laio of Renoof nom RLEAK AHS Data Ana21ysis 1,
Analysis 1,Ratsin Dw elng oIcm RATSC AHS Data 2
ExtincD l fRSho eS  t  alysis ,
AllState STATE AHS Data Analyses
Median State Property Value VALUE Co uted from Analysis 1,
Autor' Aalys2,
Legality of Waiver of the IWH es A rshior Anal4sis 2,
168. Most values for the monthly-rent variable were transcribed directly from AHS data.
Where rent rates in the AHS data referred to periods longer or shorter than one month, the rate
was computed to match its monthly equivalent.
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1. Variables
The variables used in the analyses collectively represented several
categories related to economics, dwelling characteristics, dwelling con-
ditions, and neighborhood conditions.169 Because AHS Surveys did
not include the same variables in every annual survey, the variables
included in each analysis necessarily varied slightly over the years ex-
amined. 170 Despite these changes, the categories to which the vari-
ables related did remain constant. Economic variables included
monthly rent, renters' incomes, median incomes, and other costs re-
lated to housing. Housing-characteristics variables measured dwell-
ings' physical qualities such as the number of rooms and the existence
of an elevator. Housing-conditions variables measured the existence
of negative housing conditions such as holes in the walls. The selec-
tion of specific variables depended upon the analysis.171
2. Data Used
The AHS surveys employed in this study provided household data
collected on an annual basis; however, the surveys were not conducted
in all fifty states each year and examined different variables over the
course of the years examined.172 Because some of the AHS surveys
lacked representative samples of states that used the implied warranty
and those that did not, only those years with representative samples of
both were examined. The years examined for each analysis are dis-
cussed in the description of that analysis.
Only two variables required data outside of that provided by the
AHS surveys: the implied warranty variable and the waiver variable.
For these variables, it was necessary to determine the year that each of
the examined states adopted the implied warranty and whether the
implied warranty was subject to waiver in that state. These pieces of
169. Economic variables included renter's income, median state income, median state prop-
erty value, and monthly rent rate, among others. Dwelling-characteristics variables included
number of rooms, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and existence of a cellar, among
others. Dwelling-condition variables included holes in the walls, peeling paint, rats in the dwell-
ing, and leaks in the roof, among others.
170. Early AHS surveys included fewer variables than those conducted after the mid-1980s.
Furthermore, several preexisting variables were modified in later surveys to measure conditions
or responses in a slightly different manner.
171. The rationales for choosing specific variables for each analysis are discussed in the de-
scriptions of the individual analyses.
172. See DVD: American Housing Survey (AHS) Metropolitan Microdata Files 1974-1983
and 1984-2004 (U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev. 2006) (on file with author). For a full list
of AHS survey locations and years that each location was surveyed, see Dates of American
Housing Survey Metropolitan Areas, U.S. CENSus BUREAU, www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/
ahs/metrodates.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
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data, obtained through legislative history and case law, are displayed
in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: STATE ADOPTION DATES AND WAIVER1 7 3



















173. See ALA. CODE § 35-9A-204 (2009) (effective June 1, 2007); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-1324, -1325 (2007) (effective Aug. 8, 1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-503 (2007) (effective
Sept. 1, 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-7 (2006) (effective Jan. 1, 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 83.51, .56 (2004) (effective 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 383.595, 383.625, 383.635 to .645
(LexisNexis 2002) (effective July 13, 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3221 (2009) (effective
1974); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211 (LexisNexis 2010) (effective 1980); MICH. COMP.
LAws § 554.139 (2005) (effective Oct. 1, 1968); MIrN. STAT. § 504.1B.161 (2002) (effective 1999);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-8-23 (1999) (effective July 1, 1991); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b
(McKinney 2006) (effective 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04, .07 (West 2004) (effective
1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 118-121 (1999) (effective 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.320
(2007) (effective 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304 (2004) (effective July 1, 1975); VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.13, .25 (2007) (effective July 1, 1974); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.060 (2004)
(effective July 16, 1973); Wis. STAT. § 704.07 (2001) (effective 1970); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Green v. Superior Court of S.F., 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974);
Thompson v. Crownover, 381 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 1989); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208
(Ill. 1972); Breezewood Mgmt. Co. v. Maltbie, 411 N.E.2d 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Steele v.
Latimer, 521 P.2d 304 (Kan. 1974); Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass.
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After formatting and analysis, the data sets resembled Figure 3.174
Each line represented a case or individual dwelling unit. The first col-
umn represented the dwelling number; all of the following columns
represented the specific variables included in the analysis. Numeric
values assigned to the variables indicated the value of a specific re-
sponse. Economic variables, such as monthly rent rate and annual
household income, were measured with values that represented dollar
amounts. Yes-or-no survey responses, such as the roof-leaks variable,
were measured as "dummy variables" 1 7 5 with a 1 (yes) or 0 (no)
value.17 6 When the AHS data assigned multiple values to a yes-or-no
survey response, such as 9 for "no answer," the value was removed
174. Data preparation primarily encompassed the conversion of AHS data from ASCII for-
mat to a standard spreadsheet format. Other elements of data preparation included conversion
of variable values into a standardized format, deletion of irrelevant variables, and computation
of variables derived from AHS data. SPSS Statistics 18 was used for all advanced statistical
analyses. For further information about SPSS, see IBM SPSS STATISTICS, http://www.spss.com/
statistics (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
175. The term "dummy variables" refers to variables that were originally measured in a cate-
gorical format. For example, variables measuring the existence or nonexistence of the implied
warranty of habitability are categorical in nature; therefore, it was necessary to convert these
variables into a numeric format for use in the regression analysis. The conversion process is
referred to as creating a dummy variable, whereby a "yes" response to a variable becomes a 1 in
the dataset and a "no" response becomes a 0. Both the implied warranty variable (IWH) and
the waiver variable (WAIVER) were measured as dummy variables; the existence of the implied
warranty gave IWH a value of 1 and the ability to waive the implied warranty gave WAIVER a
value of 1.
176. In many instances, dummy variables were recoded from the values assigned by AHS to
standardized 1 and 0 values.
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and not included in the analysis. When a yes-or-no survey response
included values indicating the degree of a problem, such as 3 for "roof
leaked for more than four months," the values were consolidated into
the corresponding yes-or-no value.
FIGURE 3: EXAMPLE DATA SET
STATE RENT INC RLEAK
Dwelling 1 9 200 10900 0
Dwelling 2 5 800 40500 0
Dwelling 3 23 225 15000 1
Dwelling 4 49 400 21980 0
Dwelling 5 49 300 12000 0
Dwelling 6 23 325 13500 0
Dwelling 7 37 225 16250 0
Dwelling 8 43 190 9000 1
Dwelling 9 5 550 19000 1
Dwelling 10 9 275 15000 0
B. Method
Three of the analyses conducted for this Comment utilized linear
regression. Although an in-depth discussion of linear regression is
well beyond the scope of this Comment, a basic understanding is help-
ful in order to follow the methods used in the analyses.
1. Regression Analyses of Rent Rates
Linear regression, in the most basic sense, estimates the probable
value of a dependent variable based upon the value of one or more
independent variables. 77 In estimating the probable value of a de-
pendent variable, the linear regression model determines the extent to
which each given independent variable affects the value of the depen-
dent variable.178 It is these determinations of the relationship be-
tween the independent and dependent variables that formed the focus
of this Comment's analysis. In particular, these analyses focused on
determining whether a relationship existed between the dependent
variable representing monthly rent rates and specific independent
variables representing the implied warranty. Figure 4 provides a basic
177. See, e.g., Hirsch et al., supra note 14, at 1125-26 (explaining the basic function of regres-
sion analyses).
178. Id. at 1126.
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visual representation of a regression analysis using monthly rent rates
as the dependent variable.
FIGURE 4: BASIC REGRESSION MODEL
Renter's Income Rooms in the Aparti
Independent Variable with X Independent Variable w
amount on influence over amount on influence a
Dependent Variable Dependent Variabit
a. Regression Analysis 1: Annual Implied Warranty Analysis
The annual implied warranty analysis examined the relationship be-
tween the implied warranty and rent rates. This analysis broadly fol-
lowed the example set by Werner Hirsch and his co-authors; however,
this analysis exceeded the scope of Hirsch's study with regard to the
time span, number of years examined, and number of individual cases
included. 179 The expectation that rent rates rose or fell due to the
influence of various independent factors led Hirsch to use a regression
analysis in his study.180 For the same reason, linear regression was
used for this analysis. As with Hirsch's study, the intent behind this
analysis was to determine the extent to which various independent
179. Hirsch examined data from a one-year time period with 182 respondents. Id. at 1127-28.
By contrast, this Comment's analysis examines data from 11 years spanning a 33 year period and
covering approximately 450,000 respondents.
180. See id. at 1125-26. Hirsch illustrated the expected relationship with the following
equation:
RENT = B0 + B1 (number of rooms) + B 2 (distance to center of the Standard Metropol-
itan Statistical Area (S.M.S.A.)) + B 3 (structure type) + B, (repair status) + B5 (house-
hold's average income) + B6 (lot value) + B7 (depreciation) + B8 (S.M.S.A. income) +
B9 (construction cost) + Blo (repair and deduct laws) + Bit (rent withholding and retali-
atory eviction laws) + B12 (receivership laws).
Id. at 1126.
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variables, particularly the implied warranty, could be considered
predictors of higher or lower rent rates.181
From the thirty-three year span of available data, eleven years were
chosen as the most representative samples.182 These years are listed
in Figure 5. Every state included in the AHS data for a selected year
remained in the analysis of that year. However, in several instances,
pieces of data were removed from the sample because the state desig-
nation was neither provided nor discernable from the available
information.183
During each of the eleven years examined, the annual implied war-
ranty analysis measured the relationship between selected variables
and the monthly rent paid by individual households. Each year's anal-
ysis included between 13,000 and 30,000 individual renter-occupied
households. On average, eighteen independent variables were se-
lected for each year's analysis; each variable was selected based upon
the expectation that a relationship existed between the variable and
monthly rent rates.184 Although all of the annual implied warranty
analyses included several dependent variables, other variables were
only included in the analyses for specific years. Figure 5 provides a list
of the variables included in each annual analysis.
b. Regression Analysis 2: Annual Waiver Analysis
The annual waiver analysis examined the relationship between the
ability to waive the implied warranty and rent rates. With the excep-
tion of two variable modifications, the preparation and method of this
analysis mirrored that of the annual implied warranty analysis. The
slight modifications to the annual implied warranty analysis made it
possible for the annual waiver analysis to examine contentions that a
non-waivable implied warranty would cause a greater increase in rent
rates.185
181. Id.
182. These eleven years satisfied two criteria. First, each year included a ratio of states using
the implied warranty to states not using the implied warranty that most closely resembled the
same ratio among all fifty states. Second, each year included sufficient sample sizes and high
response rates for the relevant variables. Additionally, because of the high adoption rates of the
implied warranty between 1974 and 1980, five of the eleven years examined came from that time
span.
183. The AHS data coded several states as "9999." In some cases, it was possible to deter-
mine the state's identity through reference to metropolitan codes or county codes. Where this
determination could not be made, the data was removed from the analysis.
184. The variables chosen, and listed in Figure 1, are similar in nature to those chosen by
Hirsch. See Hirsch et al., supra note 14, at 1128.
185. See, e.g., RABIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 80.
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FIGURE 5: YEARS, STATES, AND VARIABLES
Year States Variables
Arkansas, Arizona, California, District of AIR, AMTTX, BATHS, BDRMS,Columbia, Florida, Kansas, CRACKS, ELEV, HOLES, INC, IWH,
1974 Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, MDINC, MDRINC, RATS, RENT, RIMinnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New INC, RLEAK, STATE, SHOPS,
York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, VALUE
Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, AIR, AMTTX, BATHS, BDRMS,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, CRACKS, ELEV, HOLES, INC, IWH,
1975 Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, MDINC, MDRINC, PAINT, RATS,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, RENT, R/INC, RLEAK, STATE,
Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin SHOPS, VALUE
Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, District of AIR, AMTTX, BATHS, BDRMS,Columbia, Florida, Kansas, CRACKS, ELEV, HOLES, INC, IWH,
1977 Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, MDINC, MDRINC, PLASTER, RATS,Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New R/INC, RENT, RLEAK, STATE,York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, SHOPS, VALUE
Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin
California, Colorado, Connecticut, AIR, AMTTX, BATHS, BDRMS,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, CRACKS, ELEV, HOLES, INC, IWH,
1978 Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New MDINC, MDRINC, RATS, RENT, R/
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, INC, RLEAK, SHOPS, STATE,
Texas, Virginia VALUE
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Illinois, AIR, AMTTX, BATHS, BDRMS,
Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, CRACKS, ELEV, HOLES, INC, IWH,
1980 Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, New MDINC, MDRINC, PLASTER, RATS,
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, RENT, R/INC, RLEAK, STATE,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah VALUE
ABAND, AIR, AM7ITX, BATHS,
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Indiana, BDRMS, CELLAR, CRACKS,
1984 Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, GARAGE, HOLES, INC, IWH,Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, MDINC, MDRINC, PAINT, RATS,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin RENT, R/INC, RLEAK, STATE,
___ SHOPS, VALUE
ABAND, AIR, AMTTX, AMMORT,
Alabama, California, Indiana, BATHS, BDRMS, CELLAR, CRACKS,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, GARAGE, HOLES, INC, IWH,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, MDINC, MDRINC, PAINT, RATS,
Virginia, Wisconsin RENT, R/INC, RLEAK, STATE,
VALUE
ABAND, AIR, AMTTX, AMMORT,
BATHS, BDRMS, CELLAR, CRACKS,
GARAGE, HOLES, INC, IWH,
1992 Massachusetts, Ohio, Oklahoma, MDINC, MDRINC, PAINT, RATS,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia RENT, R/INC, RLEAK, STATE,
VALUE
ABAND, AIR, AMTEX, AMMORT,
BATHS, BDRMS, CELLAR, CRACKS,A996Gerkans, Cifiasppi, Cho, GARAGE, HOLES, INC, IWH,
1996TGeorgia, Mis , Ohino OMDINC, MDRINC, PAINT, RATS,
RENT, R/INC, RLEAK, STATE,
VALUE
Arkansas, California, Colorado, AIR, AMTTX, AMMORT, BATHS,
Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, BDRMS, CRACKS, GARAGE,
2004 Louisiana, Missouri, MississippiG Ohio, HOLES, INC, IWH, MDINC.
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, MDRINC, PAINT, RATS, RENT, R/
Texas, Washington INC, RLEAK, STATE, VALUE
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The variables and years studied were identical to those in the an-
nual implied warranty analysis; only the state and implied warranty
variables changed for the annual waiver analysis. The removal of
states that did not use the implied warranty in the year examined lim-
ited the scope of the state variable. The waiver variable replaced the
implied warranty variable in the analysis and indicated whether the
implied warranty was waivable or non-waivable in a given state.
c. Regression Analysis 3: Analysis of Changes over Time
The analysis of changes over time examined the relationship be-
tween the existence of the implied warranty and percentage increases
in rent rates over time. As with both annual analyses, rent rates were
expected to change due to the influence of various independent fac-
tors; therefore, this analysis also employed a linear regression model.
This analysis arose out of arguments that the implied warranty would
cause rent increases over time due to higher maintenance costs and
decreased housing stock.186 The intent was to determine whether ex-
istence of the implied warranty was significantly related to higher in-
creases in rent rates over time.
In order to maintain consistency between the locations examined
and the existence or nonexistence of the implied warranty, this analy-
sis only included five time periods. 87 These periods included 1974 to
1977, 1980 to 1984, 1984 to 1992, 1992 to 1996, and 1996 to 2004. As a
result of changes in survey locations and adoption of the implied war-
ranty during a given time period, the specific states that were ex-
amined varied by time period. Figure 6 contains a list of the locations
examined over each period of time.
Rent rate changes were computed by state and divided into two
measures of change: percentage change in the median rent rate and
percentage change in the bottom-quartile rent rate. The independent
variables consisted of the implied warranty and various economic vari-
ables.188 All economic variables were calculated in the same manner
as percentage change in rent rates; each variable represented the per-
centage change in a specific economic indicator, such as a state's me-
186. See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 11, at 889-93.
187. The five time periods chosen included the largest number of states that met two condi-
tions. First, the state had not changed its status with regard to existence/nonexistence of the
implied warranty. Second, the AHS data included the state in both the first and last year of the
time span.
188. See Figure 1, supra Part III.A.
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FIGURE 6: TIME SPANS AND STATES EXAMINED
Time Span States Examined
Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Maryland,
1974-1977 Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Massachusetts,
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin
Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Massachusetts, Ohio,
Utah, Virginia
1992-1996 Arkansas, Indiana, Ohio, Utah
1996-2004 Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois,Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Washington
dian income. 189 The selection of the economic variables was based
upon their expected effect on rent rates; each analysis of changes over
time included the same economic variables.
2. Housing-Conditions Analysis
The housing-conditions analysis examined the relationship between
the implied warranty and housing conditions. Although important to
the overall debate regarding the implied warranty, housing conditions
are not the central focus of this Comment. As a result, this analysis
was limited in both scope and depth. Instead of looking for a statisti-
cally significant relationship, this analysis focused on discerning
whether or not the evidence of a relationship between the implied
warranty and housing conditions warranted further examination.
The housing-conditions analysis retained eight of the eleven years
used for both annual analyses. 190 Variables used for this analysis in-
cluded those that pertained to housing conditions 91 as well as the im-
plied warranty variable, the waiver variable, and the state variable.
An additional variable measuring the cumulative dwelling defects was
created for this analysis. The cumulative dwelling-defects variable
(DEFECTS) represented the total number of negative housing condi-
189. For example, if a state's median income was $10,000 in 1974 and $15,000 in 1977, the
percentage change would be calculated as follows: ($15,000 - $10,000)/$10,000 = 0.5 or a 50%
increase.
190. These eight years had the highest response rates for housing-conditions variables.
191. For a full list of housing-conditions variables used, see Figure 1, supra Part III.A.
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tions present in a dwelling. 192 The value of this variable increased by
one for each housing-conditions variable that reflected a negative
condition.193
Although a regression analysis would have yielded more precise re-
sults, a basic percentile-comparison modell 94 provided sufficient re-
sults to determine whether further consideration of housing
conditions is warranted. The analysis included two variations; both
variations compared the percentage of negative housing conditions
per dwelling across two different types of locations. In the first varia-
tion, locations that recognized the implied warranty were compared
with locations that did not recognize the implied warranty. In the sec-
ond variation, locations that permitted waiver of the implied warranty
were compared with locations that did not permit waiver.
C. Interpreting the Outputs of Regression Analyses
Before examining the results, it is helpful to understand several of
the determinations made by the regression model. For the purposes
of this Comment's analyses, three determinations are relevant: the co-
efficient of determination (R2), the regression coefficient (B), and the
p-value.
The coefficient of determination (R2) represents the amount of va-
riance in the dependent variable that is "explained" regression analy-
sis.195 Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 7, if an analysis has an R2-
value of .500, the analysis can be said to account for 50% of variations
resulting in different values of the dependent variable. The signifi-
cance of the R2-value relates to each analysis as a whole; the larger
the R2, the more effective the analysis is at predicting the value of a
dependent variable.
The regression coefficient (B) demonstrates the effect of a given
independent variable on the dependent variable.196 Because the im-
plied warranty and waiver variables were both coded as dummy vari-
ables, the B-value for these variables represented the average change
in the monthly rent when the dummy variable's response was affirma-
192. This cumulative number only included negative housing conditions examined by the
analysis. It remains possible that a number of negative housing conditions not included in this
analysis or measured by AHS surveys existed in any of the dwellings examined.
193. If any of the housing conditions for a specific dwelling lacked a value, for example, had
no response, DEFECTS was not calculated for the dwelling.
194. This basic model compares the percentage of cases with a specific attribute across multi-
ple groups or conditions.
195. See N.J.D. Nagelkerke, A Note on a General Definition of the Coefficient of Deternina-
tion, 78 BIOMETRIKA 691, 691-92 (1991).
196. See Hirsch et al., supra note 14, at 1128-29.
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FIGURE 7: UNDERSTANDING R2-VALUES
Dependent Variable
RENT = $500
Determine 50% or $250 of
total value of RENT
Independent Variables
Equation R2 = .500
Determine 50% or $250 of
total value of RENT
Unknown Factors (Variables
affecting RENT that are not
included in the analysis)
tive (1). A positive B-value signified an increase in monthly rent
given an affirmative response to the implied warranty variable. Con-
versely, a negative B-value signified a decrease in monthly rent given
an affirmative response to the implied warranty variable. These pos-
sibilities are illustrated in Figure 8.
The p-value demonstrates whether the results for an entire analysis
or a specific variable are statistically significant.197 For this analysis, a
p-value of less than .01 was considered significant. 98 Therefore, a p-
value greater than .01 for a specific variable showed that the variable's
effect on the dependent variable was not statistically significant. A p-
value greater than .01 for the entire analysis showed that the analysis,
as a whole, was not statistically significant.
Regression analysis outputs are not limited to the R2, B, and p-
value; however, other outputs are not necessary to understand this
197. A p-value represents the probability that the results are the product of chance. See Mark
J. Schervish, P Values: What They Are and What They Are Not, 50 AM. STATISTICIAN 203, 203
(1996). A p-value may be considered statistically significant at the 95% level if the value is less
than .05, or it may be considered significant at the 99% level if the value is less than .01. Id.
198. Hirsch determined that his findings were statistically significant at the .05 or 95% level.
See Hirsch et al., supra note 14, at 1129 n.94. However, because of the large scale of this analysis
and the corresponding increased potential for confounding factors, the more stringent signifi-
cance level of .01 or 99% was chosen for this Comment.
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FIGURE 8: DEMONSTRATION OF B COEFFICIENT
Possibility A - IWH Not Used
All independent variables IWH has a B of 50
remamn constant IWH is not used (value of 0) ----90 Predicted Rent =$500
Predicted Rent = $500
Possibility B - Positive B-Value
All independent variables IWH has aB of 50remain constant H is used (value of 1) w. Predicted Rent $550
Predicted Rent = $500
Possibility C - Negative B-Value
All independent variables IWH has aB of -50remain constant isticallWH is used (value of 1) t Predicted Rent= $450
Predicted Rent = $500
Comment's analyses. Therefore, only the R2, B, and p-value will be
discussed in the results section below.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Both of the annual regression analyses obtained statistically signifi-
cant results. The regression analysis of changes over time, however,
did not provide statistically significant results. In the housing-condi-
tions analysis, the results showed the possibility of a relationship be-
tween the implied warranty, waiver, and housing conditions. The
results are presented below in Part IV.A-D and are discussed in Part
IV.E.
A. Regression Analysis 1: Annual Implied Warranty Analysis
The results from the annual implied warranty analysis are compiled
in Figure 9. Figure 9 includes a list of each year examined, the R2-
value for the regression analysis, and the relevant results for the im-
plied warranty variable. Although some of the years did not yield sta-
tistically significant results for the implied warranty variable, all are
included in Figure 9.
B. Regression Analysis 2: Annual Waiver Analysis
The results from the annual waiver analysis are compiled in Figure
10. Only four of the eleven years examined are included in the results;
the other seven years did not show any relationship between the
waiver variable and monthly rent. Of the four years that showed a
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FIGURE 9: RESULTS FROM ANNUAL IMPLIED WARRANTY ANALYSIS
Year R2 IWH B IWH Analysis
p-value p-value
1974 0.617 21.496 .000 .000
1975 0.583 -5.306 .199 .000
1977 0.667 13.098 .000 .000
1980 0.628 18.411 .000 .000
1984 0.546 -3.459 .721 .000
1988 0.695 97.670 .000 .000
1992 0.565 28.490 .289 .000
1996 0.661 9.877 .042 .000
2004 0.533 35.004 .000 .000
FIGURE 10: RELEVANT RESULTS FROM ANNUAL WAIVER ANALYSIS
Year R2 WAIVER B WAIVER sig. Analysis Sig.
1974 0.648 -34.648 .000 .000
1975 0.574 -7.869 .026 .000
1996 0.543 -14.732 .067 .000
2004 0.634 -36.445 .000 .000
relationship between the form of warranty used and rent rates, only
1974 and 2004 were statistically significant.
C. Regression Analysis 3: Analysis of Changes over Time
The analysis of changes over time did not produce statistically sig-
nificant results. Each analysis showed a slight positive relationship be-
tween existence of the implied warranty and percentage increases in
both bottom quartile and median rent rates. However, in all of the
analyses, the relationship between the implied warranty and percent-
age increases in rent failed to reach a level of statistical significance at
the either .01 or .05 level. Additionally, the analyses as a whole were
not significant predictors of percentage increases in rent; over the five
time spans examined, the R2-values never exceeded .350.
D. Housing-Conditions Analysis
The results from the housing-conditions analysis are compiled in
Figures 11 and 12. Figure 11 contains results from the comparison of
housing conditions between locations that recognized the implied war-
882 [Vol. 60:849
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ranty (warranty locations) and locations that did not recognize the im-
plied warranty (no-warranty locations). Figure 12 contains the results
from the comparison of housing conditions between locations that
permitted waiver of the implied warranty (waiver locations) and loca-
tions that did not permit waiver (no-waiver locations).
FIGURE 11: HOUSING CONDITIONS & WARRANTY/
NO-WARRANTY LOCATIONS
YEAR RLEAK CRACKS HOLES RATS PLASTER PAINT DEFECTS
1974 21% -3% 1% 0% X X -32%
1975 11% -2% -3% -4% X -4% -2%
1977 9% 2% 1% 7% -3% X 33%
1980 0% -1% 2% 0% -1% X -1%
1984 -13% -5% -2% -6% X -4% -64%
1988 -16% -6% -4% -9% X -6% -42%
1992 -29% -10% -7% -13% X -11% -46%
1996 -19% -7% -4% -1% X -5% -62%
FIGURE 12: HOUSING CONDITIONS & WAIVER/
NO-WAIVER LOCATIONS
YEAR RLEAK CRACKS HOLES RATS PLASTER PAINT DEFECTS
1974 -15% -1% -3% -1% X X -36%
1975 14% 1% 0% -1% X -2% 12%
1977 0% 3% 2% -12% 1% X 29%
1980 4% 3% 1% -9% 0% X 29%
1984 9% 2% 0% 0% X -1% -8%
1988 7% -3% -1% 0% X 0% 8%
1992 0% 1% 0% -2% X 0% 0%
196 1% 0% 1% 1% X 0% 5%
Figures 11 and 12 both display the results in the same manner. Vari-
ables not used in a specific year are noted with an "X." For all vari-
ables other than cumulative dwelling defects, Figures 11 and 12 list the
difference in the percentage of dwellings with a specific defect across
the two conditions. The difference was established by subtracting the
percentage of dwellings with a defect in the second condition (no-war-
ranty locations or no-waiver locations) from the percentage of dwell-
ings with a defect in the first condition (warranty locations or waiver
locations). Therefore, in Figure 11, the value of the roof leaks varia-
ble (RLEAK) for 1974 shows that 21% more dwellings in warranty
883
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locations (warranty dwellings) had roof leaks when compared with
dwellings in no-warranty locations (no-warranty dwellings). By con-
trast, in Figure 12, the value of the roof leaks variable for 1974 shows
that 15% fewer dwellings in waiver locations (waiver dwellings) had
roof leaks when compared with dwellings in no-waiver locations (no-
waiver dwellings).
The value of the cumulative dwelling-defects variable (DEFECTS)
in both Figure 11 and Figure 12 represents the percentage difference
in the average number of cumulative defects per dwelling across the
two conditions. In Figure 11, the value of the cumulative dwelling
defects variable for 1974 shows that, on average, warranty dwellings
had 32% fewer cumulative defects. In Figure 12, the value of the cu-
mulative dwelling-defects variable in 1975 shows that, on average,
waiver dwellings had 12% more cumulative defects.
E. Discussion of the Results
As noted above, not every analysis yielded significant results; how-
ever, the results that are significant shed light on the long-standing
debate over the effects of the implied warranty. The annual-regres-
sion analysis shows that a statistically significant relationship exists be-
tween the implied warranty and rent rates. Furthermore, the ability to
waive the implied warranty may affect the amount of rent a tenant
pays. Finally, the housing-conditions analysis demonstrates that fur-
ther inquiry into the effects of the implied warranty on housing condi-
tions is warranted.
1. Regression Analysis 1: Annual Implied Warranty Analysis
Figure 9 illustrates that the existence of the implied warranty can be
equated with higher rent rates in almost every year examined. 199
While the implications of these results are not black and white, the
results from this analysis provide the best evidence of the effects of
the implied warranty and provide more significant results than any of
the other analyses.
Each annual implied warranty regression analysis was significant as
a predictor of the rent rate variable's value. The lowest R2-value was
.533, the highest was .657, and the majority rose above .600. There-
fore, the majority of these analyses matched the strength of Hirsch's
analysis; indeed, some exceeded the predictive power of his analy-
sis.200 Additionally, the p-value for each annual analysis equaled .000;
199. See Figure 9, supra Part IV.A.
200. Hirsch's analysis had an R2 value of .63. Hirsch et al., supra note 14, at 1129.
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therefore, all of the analyses were statistically significant. The
strength of these analyses as a whole lends support to the individual
results of each analysis.201
Seven of the eleven years examined showed a statistically significant
relationship between the implied warranty and rent rates. In each of
these seven years, the relationship between the implied warranty and
rent rates was positive; therefore, the presence of the implied war-
ranty related to higher rent rates. Although two years showed a nega-
tive relationship between existence of the implied warranty and rent
rates, the results were not statistically significant. Therefore, every
year that yielded statistically significant results showed that the exis-
tence of the implied warranty related to higher monthly rent
payments.
The extent of rent rate increases that can be related to existence of
the implied warranty varied over the years examined. The average B-
value for the seven statistically significant years was 26. The highest
B-value equaled 97.67 and the lowest equaled 13.10. This means that
existence of the implied warranty, in an "average" year, equated to
rent payments of $26.00 more per month. However, it is necessary to
note that these findings do not prove the existence of a cause-and-
effect relationship.202 First, it can only be said that the existence of
the implied warranty increased rent $26.00 for the "average dwelling,"
and even then, this statement is only true if all other independent vari-
ables remained constant.203 Furthermore, the regression analysis as-
sumes the existence of a cause-and-effect relationship, but does not
eliminate the possibility of other confounding variables.204 Regard-
less, despite the need for caution in interpreting these results, the em-
pirical data supports an argument that the implied warranty resulted
in higher rent rates.
2. Regression Analysis 2: Annual Waiver Analysis
The annual waiver analysis provided empirical evidence that the
form of the implied warranty used may relate to higher rent rates. Of
the eleven years examined, four reached a level of significance sug-
gesting the existence of a relationship between the ability to waive the
201. See id.
202. While the assumption underlying regression analyses is that a cause-and-effect relation-
ship exists, the analyses do not actually establish the existence of such a relationship. See
Nagelkerke, supra note 195, at 691-92.
203. See id.
204. It remains possible that independent variables not used in these analyses acted as "con-
founding variables." These confounding variables would be the actual cause of the observed
relationship due to their correlation with both the dependent and independent variables. Id.
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implied warranty and rent rates. Two years, 1974 and 1984, achieved a
level of actual statistical significance.205 Despite the limited number
of statistically significant years, the results demonstrate that the ability
to waive the implied warranty related to lower average rent payments
in at least two years.
In 1974 and 1984, the average B-value (regression coefficient)
equaled -35. The conclusions that may be drawn from this average B-
value are limited.206 However, the results suggest that in these two
years, the ability to waive the implied warranty resulted in an average
rent payment of $35.00 less per month. Furthermore, in all four years
that reached a sufficient level of significance, the B-value was nega-
tive. This implies that where the analysis evidenced at least some rela-
tionship between waiver and rent rates, the ability to waive the
implied warranty related to lower rent payments.
The relationship between these results and the results from the im-
plied warranty analyses is also worth noting. For example, in 2004,
existence of the implied warranty theoretically raised rent rates by
$35.00. In the same year, the ability to waive the implied warranty
lowered rent rates by $36.00. A possible implication is that a waivable
form of the implied warranty may have raised rent rates much less
than $36.00 relative to nonexistence of the implied warranty. Hypo-
thetically, this would mean that the ability to waive the implied war-
ranty could act to offset the costs of the implied warranty in some
locations. While this implication was not examined further for this
Comment, it is one of several areas that may deserve further analysis.
3. Regression Analysis 3: Analysis of Changes Over Time
Critics of the implied warranty argued that landlord abandonment
and similar factors would lead to sharper increases in the bottom-
quartile rent rates in locations that recognized the implied warranty.
However, the analysis of changes over time provided no empirical evi-
dence of a relationship between the implied warranty and percentage
increases in rent rates.
While the lack of significant results in this analysis may be due to
methodological errors, other variables, such as percentage increase in
household income, did show statistically significant relationships with
205. If this analysis utilized the same significance level as Hirsch, .05 or 95%, three of the
years would have reached a level of statistical significance. See Hirsch et al., supra note 14, at
1129; see also supra note 198 and accompanying text.
206. See Nagelkerke, supra note 195, at 691-92.
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percentage increases in rent. 207 As no further steps were taken to pur-
sue this analysis beyond those originally planned, it remains possible
that further examination would yield statistically significant results.208
Therefore, while further analysis of this issue is warranted, there is
still no empirical evidence that the implied warranty resulted in
sharper increases in rent rates.
4. Housing-Conditions Analysis
The housing-conditions analysis yielded results that warrant further
examination of the relationship between housing defects and the im-
plied warranty. While the analysis, by design, did not measure the
statistical significance of its results, it did provide evidence that the
implied warranty positively affects the condition of rented dwellings.
Furthermore, the analysis provided evidence that the ability to waive
the implied warranty may only have a negligible effect on the overall
condition of rented dwellings.
The comparison of housing conditions between warranty locations
and no-warranty locations, Figure 11, appears to show that the condi-
tions of warranty dwellings improved relative to no-warranty dwell-
ings over the years examined.209 For example, in 1974 and 1975, roof
leaks occurred in a greater percentage of warranty dwellings than no-
warranty dwellings; however, from 1984 through 1996, roof leaks oc-
curred in a greater percentage of no-warranty dwellings. Addition-
ally, while warranty dwellings had a greater percentage of cumulative
defects in 1977, from 1980 through 1986 the cumulative number of
defects in warranty dwellings was consistently lower than in no-war-
ranty dwellings. Although these results do not prove that the implied
warranty increased housing quality, they do imply the existence of
such a relationship.
Differences in housing conditions between waiver dwellings and no-
waiver dwellings were less marked than the differences between war-
ranty dwellings and no-warranty dwellings. The results in Figure 12
appear to demonstrate that the cumulative defects in waiver dwellings
exceeded those in no-waiver dwellings until 1984.210 Beginning in
1984, however, the number of cumulative defects in waiver dwellings
207. However, the overall R2 for these analyses did not reach a threshold of significance. This
may imply that the use of a broader scope of variables and shorter time spans would return
different results.
208. Future examinations should include a greater number of independent variables and
shorter time spans. In order to accomplish this, it will likely be necessary to use data beyond
that available through AHS.
209. See Figure 11, supra Part IV.D.
210. See Figure 12, supra Part IV.D.
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became comparable to those in no-waiver dwellings. Additionally, af-
ter 1977, the difference in the percentage of dwellings with a specific
defect never exceeded 9% across the two conditions. Therefore, while
the difference between housing conditions in waiver dwellings and no-
waiver dwellings appeared greater in early years, the general trend
showed increasingly similar housing conditions in later years.
F. Limitations of Results
It is important to note that limitations to these analyses exist and
must be considered when determining the implications of this Com-
ment. First, the inherent limitations of the methods used require cau-
tion in the interpretation of the results. Furthermore, the possibility
of errors in the methodology should not be discounted, particularly
with regard to the analysis of changes over time.
With regard to the inherent limitations of the methods used, it
should be noted that these analyses did not "prove" anything. Al-
though the strength of the regression analyses provided powerful em-
pirical evidence to support arguments that the implied warranty raised
rent rates, they did not prove the existence of a causal relationship
between the implied warranty and increased rent rates. 211 Instead, the
analyses demonstrated that the data does not disprove such a relation-
ship.212 Furthermore, the analysis of housing conditions did not test
for statistical significance and only examined a limited number of
housing conditions. 213 As such, further analysis is required before
concluding that the implied warranty improved housing quality.
Errors in the methodology of this analysis are possible; indeed, even
the forms of analysis used in this Comment are open to criticism. 214 It
is not known if limitations in the available data affected the results,
nor is it known if analysis of additional years would have yielded dif-
ferent results. In particular, the lack of a significant relationship in the
regression analysis of changes over time may have resulted from the
examination of time spans that were too long.
Despite the inherent and methodological limitations, the statisti-
cally significant results obtained do provide a wealth of empirical evi-
211. The R2 allows us to predict the value of a dependent variable based upon a given inde-
pendent variable; it demonstrates variation given certain circumstances but does not establish
cause and effect. See Nagelkerke, supra note 195, at 691.
212. See id.; Schervish, supra note 197, at 203.
213. The housing conditions examined were limited to those that the AHS included in its
surveys. Furthermore, housing conditions with extremely low response rates were excluded
from all analyses.
214. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 5, at 842 (criticizing Hirsch's use of this form of statistical
analysis in the examination of rent rates).
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dence beyond that previously available. Furthermore, these results
provide insight and direction for further examination of these
relationships.
V. IMPACT
To the extent that this Comment attempts to determine whether or
not the implied warranty is related to higher rent rates, the conclusion
appears affirmative. However, this determination does not "solve"
the debate over the implied warranty; instead, it changes the focus.
For forty years, the central axis of the debate has been whether or not
rent rates would increase following adoption of the implied warranty
of habitability. 215 As a result, arguments over the possibility of rent
increases have dwarfed discussions of how to handle such increases. 216
Furthermore, judicial intent, legislative policies, and alternative argu-
ments have been glossed over to emphasize legal economics. 217 For
academics and legislatures alike, discussion and debate over the im-
plied warranty should now focus on determining if higher rent rates
undermine the fundamental policies behind the warranty and, if so,
what actions can remedy the current situation.
A. Impact on the Academic Debate
To the extent that opponents of the implied warranty argued that its
adoption would result in higher rent rates, the empirical evidence sup-
ports their claims. Despite the importance of this conclusion to the
underlying arguments of the debate, it does not resolve the overarch-
ing concerns that have fueled the debate.218 A desire for affordable
housing, particularly for the poor, fueled academics like Hirsch in crit-
icizing the implied warranty. 219 Knowledge that rent rates increased
should intensify, not dampen, these concerns. Furthermore, rent rates
are only proximately related to the concerns for tenants' rights and
increased housing quality.220 Insofar as these concerns are used to
215. See id.; Strahilevitz, supra note 3, at 1876.
216. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 5, at 842 (discussing the arguments over the effects on rent
rates); Hirsch et al., supra note 14, at 1101 (emphasizing the debate between Ackerman and
Komesar as it related to rent rates and minimizing arguments over subsidy programs and
alternatives).
217. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 259-63 (discussing only the economics of the debate
with minimal consideration for how increased rent rates affect the intended goals).
218. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 13, at 382-85.
219. Hirsch et al., supra note 14, at 1139.
220. Craswell, supra note 13, at 382-85.
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measure the efficacy of the implied warranty, future arguments should
be framed around, but not determined by, the increase in rent rates. 221
A determination that rent rates increased does not preclude debates
over how to maintain affordable housing under the implied war-
ranty.222 Despite the perceptions of Ackerman and Kennedy as "dis-
senters" who simply argued that rent rates would not increase, 223 both
acknowledged that rent rates could increase. 224 Accordingly, they
propounded methods of counteracting such a situation with supple-
mentary programs.225 Ackerman proposed a number of subsidy- and
tax-related programs to offset potential financial harm created by
strict code enforcement.226 In light of current troubles in federal sub-
sidy programs 227 and evidence that rent rates did increase, Acker-
man's proposals may be owed further examination. 228
221. See id. at 383-85.
222. See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1105, 1108; Kennedy, supra
note 13, at 500, 505.
223. See Hirsch et at., supra note 14, at 1101; Rabin, supra note 1, at 559.
224. Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1112 (stating that it was possible
that "rent levels in 'code' houses would rise somewhat as residents from 'subcode' apartments
find the code houses relatively more attractive than before"); Kennedy, supra note 13, at 506
("Microeconomic theory at this level of abstraction cannot tell us what to expect.").
225. See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1113-34 (discussing various
methods of using taxes or housing subsidies to limit the impact of strict code enforcement on
rents); Kennedy, supra note 13, at 497-501 (discussing the use of selective code enforcement as a
method of keeping rent rates from increasing after implementation of a code enforcement
program).
226. See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1113-34. In part, these pro-
grams were an attempt to ensure the effectiveness of redistribution of wealth through code en-
forcement. Id. at 1188. The propriety of using the implied warranty for wealth redistribution is
an ongoing debate. Id. (noting that the intent to use code enforcement for redistribution "may,
in the eyes of those who make their spiritual home the University of Chicago, be enough to
invalidate the program's entire claim to legitimacy").
227. For varying perspectives on current problems and debates in the area of federal housing
subsidies, see generally Michael A. Fletcher, Bid to Cut Housing Subsidies Is Decried, WASH.
PosT, June 26, 2005, at A01 (discussing attempts to discontinue federal housing subsidies in
order to limit "handouts" and encourage homeownership); Michael A. Fletcher, Worry over
Public Housing, WASH. PosT, June 26, 2005, at A03 (describing the negative impact of reduced
housing subsidies for the poor); Roger K. Lewis, In Downturn, Build up Stock of Affordable
Rental Housing, WASH. PosT, Dec. 20, 2008, at 506 (arguing for increased subsidies to build up
affordable housing stock); Timothy Williams, Eviction Anxiety Rattles a Formerly Subsidized
Upper Manhattan Building, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, at A37 (discussing 633 eviction notices
sent out after housing subsidies were discontinued).
228. Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1113-70. For other arguments
regarding the best method of ensuring housing affordability, see Komesar, supra note 11, at
1175-80 (critiquing Ackerman's subsidy model and providing alternative examples); Schwallie,
supra note 11, at 547-50 (critiquing subsidies and selective code enforcement as methods of
increasing affordability while advocating for alternative programs); but see Salins, supra note 8,
at 23-25 (stating that the goal of increasing housing affordability is a "moving target" without
defined lines that "can never be eliminated").
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Kennedy's arguments that selective code enforcement could prove
beneficial in certain neighborhoods are similarly deserving of further
consideration. 229 The extent to which landlord abandonment and
housing stock depletion caused increased rent remains debatable. 230
Nevertheless, for those who believe that these are relevant considera-
tions, Kennedy's proposals regarding selective code enforcement pro-
vide a foundation for programs intended to increase affordability
under the implied warranty.231 The propriety, efficacy, and applica-
tion of selective code enforcement programs are debatable; however,
there remains significant support for the belief that these programs
could ameliorate rent increases.232
Concerns over increased housing quality and benefits for tenants as
a class are addressed only in part by this Comment. The evidence
suggests that housing quality improved under the implied warranty;233
whether or not this evidence signifies that tenants benefited as a class
remains debatable. 234 It is not unreasonable to assume that increased
rent rates harm tenants; 235 however, this assumption is not universally
accepted.236 Both Richard Craswell and Richard Markovits believed
that rent rates would increase after the adoption of the implied war-
ranty; however, they simultaneously concluded that the warranty
would benefit tenants. 237 Their arguments focused on the premise
that tenants would only pay increased rent to the extent that they felt
benefitted.238 Under Craswell's analysis, the only real measure of the
effectiveness of the implied warranty was the extent to which rent
rates increased. 239 Therefore, in light of the simultaneous increases in
rent and housing quality, a debate over the effectiveness of the im-
plied warranty remains open for further consideration.
This Comment resolves one narrow issue that has overwhelmed de-
bates over the implied warranty. However, in the holistic sense, a de-
229. See Kennedy, supra note 13, at 497-501.
230. This issue has been widely cited as an expected cause of rent increases. See, e.g., POSNER,
supra note 11, at 259-63; Meyers, supra note 11, at 892-94. Although this Comment determines
that existence of the implied warranty related to higher rent rates, it did not determine causal
relationships. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
231. See Kennedy, supra note 13, at 497-504.
232. Id.
233. See supra Part IV.E.4.
234. Compare POSNER, supra note 11, at 259-63 (arguing that rent increases harm tenants),
with Craswell, supra note 13, at 382-85 (arguing that rent increases do not necessarily harm
tenants), and Markovits, supra note 13, at 1819-20 (same).
235. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 259-63.
236. Craswell, supra note 13, at 382-83; Markovits, supra note 13, at 1817, 1820.
237. Craswell, supra note 13, at 382-98; Markovits, supra note 13, at 1817, 1820.
238. Craswell, supra note 13, at 382-83; Markovits, supra note 13, at 1817, 1820.
239. See Craswell, supra note 13, at 398.
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termination that rent rates increased fails to inform several highly
pertinent questions: Would the use of supplementary programs allevi-
ate future increases in rent?240 Have tenants benefited as a class? 241
Have poor tenants been dealt more harm than benefit? 242 Do tenants
exercise their rights? 243 Is a goal of wealth redistribution satisfied if
rent rates increase? 244 Should increased rents in residential settings
preclude imputation of similar warranties in condominiums or com-
mercial leases? 245 As the implied warranty moves forward and ex-
pands into new contexts, these questions remain highly relevant to any
academic discourse of the topic.
B. Impact on Future Legislation
Forty-nine states have adopted the implied warranty;246 this Com-
ment does not prove or allege that doing so was in error. Nor is it
implied that Arkansas' decision not to adopt the implied warranty247
was either preferable or unwise. Instead, this Comment presents a
basis for reevaluation of specific state statutes based upon the policies
that each state hopes to advance.
To the extent that an individual state is primarily concerned with
the affordability of rental housing, particularly for the poor, the re-
sults of this analysis signify that the implied warranty may be counter-
productive. 248 Outright abandonment of the implied warranty would
not necessarily correct this problem;249 however, other options remain
for future legislation. Supplementary programs, such as those dis-
cussed by Ackerman and Kennedy, may alleviate current and future
rent rates by decreasing the burdens on landlords and tenants alike.250
Furthermore, limiting the breadth of current statutes may also de-
crease the costs that landlords must pass on to their tenants.251 Fi-
nally, where affordability is the primary concern, waiver of the
240. See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1113-70; Kennedy, supra
note 13, at 497-504.
241. See Craswell, supra note 13, at 398.
242. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 259-63.
243. See Blasi, supra note 158, at 865.
244. See generally Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1188.
245. See Bogart, supra note 109, at 275; Brennan, supra note 109, at 3041.
246. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
247. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-601 (2003).
248. See supra Part IV.E.1.
249. Accord Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 13, at 1188.
250. See id. at 1113-70; Kennedy, supra note 13, at 497-504.
251. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 260-61.
[Vol. 60:849892
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
warranty should be permitted. 252 While none of these considerations
guarantee lower rent in the future, the analyses indicate that they are
among the most viable options.253
For those states where quality of housing was the primary concern
in enacting the implied warranty, there is reason to believe that the
implied warranty succeeded in achieving its intended goals. The re-
sults are not overwhelming, but they do connote a relationship be-
tween the implied warranty and fewer defects in the average
residential leased property.254 If it is accepted by these states that in-
creased rent is a fair price for higher quality housing, the implied war-
ranty has been a success.
Perhaps the most significant implication of this analysis is for those
states that have determined the implied warranty cannot be waived. 255
Although not examined at length in the analysis, the effects of prohib-
iting waiver may require reexamination of existing statutes. The pub-
lic policy behind these proscriptions is reasonable: the implied
warranty would be ineffective if tenants could waive it through con-
tracts of adhesion.256 However, to the extent that quality of housing
reflects the effectiveness of the implied warranty, the ability or inabil-
ity to waive the warranty may not drastically alter its efficacy.257 At
the same time, the prohibition of waiver is statistically related to
higher rent rates.258 Attempts to protect tenants with the implied war-
ranty may be commendable; 259 however, this analysis suggests that
tenant protection through proscription of waiver may cause harm
without a corresponding benefit.260 Therefore, waiver of the implied
warranty, though seemingly undesirable, is an option that all states
should consider.
252. Prohibition of waiver of the implied warranty is statistically related to higher rent rates.
See supra Part IV.E.2.
253. This Comment finds that these considerations had the most significant relationship with
higher rent rates. See supra Part IV.E.
254. See supra Parts IV.D, E.4.
255. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-503(5) (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWs ch. 111, § 127L
(LexisNexis 2009); Wis. STAT. § 704.07(1) (2008).
256. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court of S.F., 517 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Cal. 1974) ("[P]ublic
policy requires that landlords generally not be permitted to use their superior bargaining power
to negate the warranty of habitability rule.").
257. There was no significant difference in the quality of housing when states permitting
waiver were compared with states that did not permit waiver. See supra Part IV.D, E.4.
258. See supra Part IV.E.4.
259. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,
763-70 (1983) (advocating the use of paternalism through proscription of waivers of the implied
warranty of habitability).
260. See supra Part IV.E.4.
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As legislatures move forward in reexamining and expanding the
rights and obligations of landlords and tenants, they should consider
the goals and policies behind their legislation in light of this analysis.
This Comment does not presume that there is one "right answer" for
the creation of landlord-tenant laws. Instead, the policies and goals
of each individual state should determine which approach best serves
their needs.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that empirical evidence demonstrates the ex-
istence of a relationship between the implied warranty of habitability
and higher rent rates. In light of that evidence, this Comment goes
one step further, arguing that the determination of such a relationship
creates as many questions as it does answers. Evidence that the im-
plied warranty raised rent rates does not preclude determining that
tenants benefited as a class. If further analyses determine that the
implied warranty did improve housing conditions, tenants may have
benefitted by paying higher rent rates in exchange for fewer out-of-
pocket repair costs. Additionally, if further analyses do not establish a
relationship between the implied warranty and percentage increase in
the bottom-quartile rent rates, low-income tenants may not have
borne the burden of increased rent rates. For those seeking to further
shed light on the effects of the implied warranty, these questions pro-
vide a suitable route. However, regardless of the empirical evidence
that this or future analyses establish, the "correct" method for crea-
tion and modification of landlord-tenant laws must always be guided
by the public policy and goals of the legislature.
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